Introduction
Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia has remained a de facto independent state since 1991.[1] Historically, the unified state of Somalia did not exist as an independent sovereign entity until 1960.[2] Before the unification of Somaliland and Somalia, the territories were administered by local regional leaders. In the 1880s the region was divided by colonial powers: the British colonised Somaliland while Italy colonised Somalia. Both states gained their independence in 1960. Notably, Somaliland was expressly recognised as a sovereign state by 35 nations including permanent members of the UN Security Council before it voluntarily joined Somalia to form the Somali Republic.[3] Following a period of civil conflict, Somaliland withdrew from the union in 1991 and once again declared itself an independent sovereign state.[4]
In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, in which Somaliland agreed to lease a portion of its coastline in exchange for formal recognition.[5] Somalia subsequently repudiated the agreement, viewing it as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This sparked a significant diplomatic rift between Ethiopia and Somalia. In an effort to resolve the tension, the two nations signed the Ankara Declaration to revitalise their diplomatic relationship.[6] Under this declaration, Ethiopia reaffirmed its commitment to respect Somalia’s sovereignty, while Somalia, in turn, committed to facilitating Ethiopia’s access to the sea for commercial purposes through existing Somali ports. Consequently, some analysts argue that the Ankara Declaration precludes Ethiopia from pursuing the maritime accord further suggesting that any future recognition of Somaliland would constitute a breach of this agreement.[7] Adopting a legalistic framework, this paper evaluates the validity of the Ankara Declaration under international law to determine whether it creates a binding obligation that prevents Ethiopia from recognising Somaliland.
Ethiopia and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
Historical documents demonstrate that Ethiopia was possessed an extensive coastline along the Red Sea.[8] However, Ethiopia’s recognition of Eritrea as an Italian colony in 1890 followed by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia’s unconditional recognition of Eritrean statehood in 1993 left Ethiopia landlocked and heavily reliant on the port of Djibouti.[9] Although the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front dismissed Ethiopia’s maritime claims as the agenda of jingoists, many Ethiopians persistently invoke Ethiopia’s legitimate and historical rights over the Red Sea, particularly regarding the port of Assab. In 2019, Ethiopia endorsed a foreign policy document asserting that the nation should secure access to the Red Sea. On October 23, 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed explicitly stated that legal, historical and demographic justifications legitimise Ethiopia’s quest for Red Sea access and he called upon neighbouring coastal states to negotiate.[10] However, no coastal state expressed a willingness to do so.
As a result, to realise it’s perceived historical rights over the Red Sea, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the internationally unrecognised state of Somaliland. Under this agreement, Ethiopia agreed to formally recognize Somaliland; in return, Somaliland agreed to lease 20 kilometres of its coastline to Ethiopia for 50 years.[11] International organissations including the AU, UN, EU and the Arab League alongside nations such as the USA, China, Somalia and Egypt condemned the maritime accord as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. To de-escalate the situation, Turkey facilitated mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia. This led to the signing of the Ankara Declaration in which Ethiopia promised to respect Somalia’s sovereignty, while Somalia agreed to grant Ethiopia commercial sea access through its territory.
In an unexpected move, Israel officially recognised Somaliland as an independent sovereign state on 26 December 2025 under the Abraham Accords. This makes it the first United Nations member state to recognise Somaliland. Analysts argue that Israel’s decision was driven by strategic and military interests in the Red Sea.[12] Specifically, it allows Israel to expand its military footprint to counter Houthi threats. Furthermore, recognition provides Israel with a critical maritime partner at the Port of Berbera, securing vital trade routes and enhancing intelligence-gathering capabilities near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Finally, some speculate the move relates to broader regional demographic shifts and aspirations regarding Gaza. Critics contend that Israel’s recognition will instigate Ethiopia to reconsider and revitalise its maritime accord with Somaliland. Despite these arguments, Ethiopia remained silent neither accepting nor condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. This occurred even as several international and regional institutions such as the African Union, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and states including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti condemned Israel’s act as a violation of international law.
Does the Ankara Declaration Preclude Ethiopia from Reconstituting the Maritime Accord?
The maritime accord signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland sparked a year-long diplomatic rift with Somalia, which persisted until Turkey brokered the Ankara Declaration in 2024. Under this declaration, Ethiopia committed to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Consequently, critics may argue that if Ethiopia were to recognize Somaliland’s statehood following a potential precedent set by Israel it would constitute a dereliction of its international obligations under the Ankara Declaration. However, this paper contends that the Ankara Declaration does not preclude Ethiopia from recognising Somaliland, and that such recognition would not constitute a violation of international law for the following reasons.
Firstly, the Ankara Declaration functions merely as a “gentlemen’s agreement” rather than a binding treaty.[13] The Declaration uses non-binding diplomatic language such as “agreed to closely work together” and “pledged to resolve differences,” which reflects its character as a statement of political intent rather than a legally enforceable obligation. Moreover, the Declaration was neither ratified by the Ethiopian Parliament nor registered with the United Nations Secretariat. It is a generally accepted principle of international law that informal political declarations do not create legally binding obligations on signatories. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 102 of the UN Charter, agreements not registered with the UN Secretary-General cannot be invoked before any organ of the United Nations, thereby limiting their legal enforceability.[14]
Secondly, the Ankara Declaration lacks a rescission clause. The Declaration does not explicitly mandate the annulment of the Memorandum of Understanding previously signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Without a clear and unambiguous clause rescinding prior agreements, Ethiopia maintains its sovereign prerogative to pursue its maritime interests and its diplomatic path with Somaliland. In international law, restrictions upon a state’s independence cannot be presumed; therefore, without a clear and unambiguous provision intended to terminate the pre-existing maritime accord, Ethiopia’s sovereign prerogative to engage in bilateral relations remains unimpaired. Consequently, the Ankara Declaration functions as a parallel diplomatic track rather than a legal replacement for the Somaliland MoU.
Some may contend that the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” imposes Ethiopia the obligation to uphold the promises made in the Ankara Declaration. However, this principle which has reached the status of customary international law binds a state to its agreements only when a bilateral or multilateral agreement has undergone the formal treaty-making process.[15] The Ankara Declaration represents a mere expression of political will intended to restore diplomatic relations between the two states. Because it did not undergo the formal process of domestic ratification or official treaty registration, it does not constitute a legally binding instrument under international law. Consequently, the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” does not impose a mandatory international obligation on Ethiopia to act in accordance with the Declaration.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties qualifies every agreement as a treaty, irrespective of its designation, as long as other preconditions stated in the article are fulfilled.[16] Accordingly, some may refute the non-binding nature of this declaration by contending that, although the Ankara Declaration is designated as a “declaration,” it can still create binding international obligations. However, the critical test for a treaty is the intent of the states to be legally bound under international law. In this instance, the Ankara Declaration lacks the language of obligation such as shall or undertakes typically found in binding instruments.
Furthermore, regarding the lack of ratification of the Declaration, critics may invoke Article 46 of the VCLT, which precludes states from citing domestic law as a justification for non-performance.[17] Yet, this argument is misplaced here. In treaty-making process, a mere signature does not, by itself, create a binding obligation to perform the treaty’s substantive terms. Instead, the absence of ratification serves as objective evidence that the parties intended a gentlemen’s agreement political instrument designed to restore diplomatic rapport rather than a legal framework intended to supersede prior sovereign commitments.
[1] Yost, Nathan, ‘In The Shadows Of Sovereignty: An Analysis Of The Legality Of The Memorandum Of Understanding Between Ethiopia Between Ethiopia and Somaliland’ 2025 40(4) American University International Law Review <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol40/iss4/7> accessed 19 February 2026.
[2] Peter Pbam, ‘The Somaliland Exception: Lessons on Post conflict State Building from the Part of the Former Somalia That Works’ (2012) 3(3) Marine Corps University Journal.
[3] Temesgen Sisay Beyene, ‘Declaration of Statehood by Somaliland and the Effects of Non-Recognition under International Law’ (2019) Beijing Law Review.
[4] Dimitrios Lalos, ‘Between Statehood and Somalia: Reflections of Somaliland Statehood’ (2011) 10(4) Washington University Global Studies Law Review.
[5] Reuters, ‘Somalia rejects port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland’ accessed from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02/> accessed 19 February 2026.
[6] Gedifew Sewenet Yigzaw, ‘Balancing National Priorities: Ethiopia’s Ankara Declaration and Its Implications for Diplomatic Success A Commentary’ (2024) 6(1) Pan African Journal of Governance and Development.
[7] Salim Said Salim, ‘Maritime Access and Sovereignty: A Legal Analysis of the Ankara Declaration Between Ethiopia and Somalia’ 2024 SIDRA Institute Policy Analysis.
[8] Firehewet Asres Amte, ‘The Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement since 2018 and Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea’ (MA Thesis, Addis Abeba University 2024).
[9] Workaferahu Aklilu, ‘Ethiopia’s Quest for Access to the Sea and Its Implications for Relations with Neighboring Littoral Countries’ (MA Thesis, Addis Abeba University 2025).
[10] Fana Television, ‘ከጠብታ ውኃ እስከ ባሕር ውኃ’ [From a Drop of Water to the Sea]’accessed from < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nIkF0lF2Tw> accessed 19 February 2026.
[11] ‘Ethiopia’s gambit for a port is unsettling a volatile region: Abiy Ahmed is doing a deal for a stretch of Somaliland’s coast’ The Economist (London, 2 January 2024) <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/02/ethiopias-gambit-for-a-port-is-unsettling-a-volatile-region> accessed 19 February 2026.
[12]BBC ‘Why Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state is controversial’ <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c14v4kmg275> accessed 19 February 2026.
[13] Tilahun Adamu Zewudie, Decoding the Ankara Declaration: Implications for diplomatic, security affairs past and future (2025) unpublished.
[14] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) UNTS XVI.
[15] Reza Bagoes Widiyantoro and Joko Setiyono, ‘Analysis of the Principles of the Sunt Servanda Pacta in International Criminal Law Enforcement: Implementation and Challenges’ (2025) Journal of Social Science.
[16] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art. 2.
[17] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art. 46.
