Introduction
The Alliance of Sahel States, also known in French as the ‘Alliance des Etats du Sahel’ (AES), is a confederation formed by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.[1] The AES was established in September 2023, following the adoption of the Charter of Liptako-Gourma, which establishes the Alliance of Sahel States.[2] The AES Charter was signed by Presidents Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, Abdourahamane Tiani of Niger, and Assimi Goita of Mali. On the day of the alliance, it was declared that the AES was established in response to regional instability, terrorism, and economic hardship in the Sahel trio.[3] There are three founding states of the AES, but other states may join the AES under Article 11 of the AES Charter.[4]
The AES Member States and ECOWAS
All AES member states are former member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The relationship between the AES states and ECOWAS turned sour after military coups took place in Mali on 18 August 2020, Burkina Faso in January and September 2022, and Niger on 26 July 2023.[5] After the coups, the junta-led states experienced crises, including the suspension of political parties, the military’s involvement in politics, and the suppression of media houses. Also, there have been breaches of some basic rights and fundamental freedoms due to arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings and others permitted by military leaderships.[6] Consequently, the ECOWAS temporarily suspended their membership for violating the fundamental principles of ECOWAS, with the condition that the suspension will be lifted upon the restoration of democratic rule. Furthermore, ECOWAS issued a declaration establishing a no-fly zone for all commercial flights and froze all central bank assets. Such sanctions were imposed upon the junta-led states in line with Article 77 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 2010.[7] Dissatisfied with the sanctions, the junta-led states detached from ECOWAS on 29 January 2025. The move threatens the normative foundation of African regionalism since it was a retaliatory response to the legitimate sanctions which exist in most African regional blocs.
The Effects of the Creation of the AES
The creation of the AES has negative impacts on ECOWAS, including the termination of regional ties established by the Sahel trio and other ECOWAS Member States.[8] Such ties include ECOWAS citizenship for citizens of the three states; the cessation of the common market economy and other political, economic, and social relationships. However, some of the major effects are discussed hereunder.
Blocking ECOWAS from Restoring Democracy in the Sahel Trio
Following coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, ECOWAS initiated a series of diplomatic talks with the junta-led states to restore democratic leadership.[9] For instance, ECOWAS threatened to resort to military intervention in Niger after a coup in 2023 if Niger refused to peacefully restore democratic leadership. Furthermore, ECOWAS imposed political and financial sanctions against the junta-led states, all aimed at restoring democratic leadership. Until the junta-led states decided to withdraw from ECOWAS, ECOWAS was still engaged in diplomatic talks with them regarding the restoration of democracy.[10] Therefore, the formation of AES means that ECOWAS has been blocked from the affairs of the junta-led states, including the restoration of democracy in those States.
The Continuation of Military/Junta Regimes
The creation of the AES has led to a continuation of junta regimes in the AES Member States. This is because the Sahel trio were previously sanctioned by ECOWAS and were required to restore democratic rule in their states.[11] However, the reluctance of the Sahel trio to restore democratic and civic governments led the former ECOWAS Member States, under junta regimes, to create the AES. This means the AES was fashioned to maintain the junta regimes existing in the Sahel trio.[12] Consequently, in the AES region, there is a ban on political parties; the dismantling of democratic institutions; a ban on independent and international media; extrajudicial killings of the opposers of junta regimes, among other human rights violations.[13]
Formation of the Regional Military Bloc
Africa has several regional blocs, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), ECOWAS, and others. Such blocs are economically oriented, aiming at achieving a single African Economic Community (AEC) under the Abuja Treaty. However, the AES, unlike other blocs, was established primarily for a military alliance.[14] This is by Articles 5 and 6 of the AES Charter, which provides that the AES is established to suppress external aggression and other military factors that may interfere with the sovereignty of the Member States. But the AES was not established with primary goals such as a common market, a customs union, or a monetary union.
Concluding Thoughts
Generally, the formation of AES by the junta-led states from ECOWAS is a huge blow, given that ECOWAS is the oldest REC, having celebrated its 50th anniversary since its founding in 1975.[15] The creation of the AES communicates a negative message to African RECs. This is because of the precedent that has been set by the AES to the effect that, at any time, member states may withdraw from RECs to avoid sanctions. This could, in turn, bring disintegration of regionalism in Africa once states violating the fundamental principles of RECs that they are members of, would walk out of RECs and create other RECs to avoid sanctions, as is the case with the Sahel trio.
On the other hand, the formation of AES sends a message of alert to African RECs that depart from the pursuit of Afrocentric interests. For instance, the ECOWAS has been accused by the AES and some ECOWAS states of promoting the eurocentric interests of the former colonial masters. Thus, on a positive side, it can be argued that African RECs which do not adhere to the core Afrocentric interests have been notified that they shall continue to witness the withdrawal of members. Unless they continue to promote Pan-Africanism.
[1] Cynthia Nkechi Osuchukwu, Wilson Chibuzor Iteke, and Ifeanyi Godspower Emesiani ‘The Alliance of Sahel States and the Future of West African Regional Integration’ [2025] Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies 27.
[2] Charter of Liptako-Gourma Establishing the Alliance of Sahel States 2023.
[3] Editorial Board, ‘Understanding the Alliance of Sahel States (AES: Alliance des États du Sahel)’ (Socialist Workers League, 11 Mach 2035) <https://socialistworkersleague.org/2025/03/11/understanding-the-alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-alliance-des-etats-du-sahel/> accessed 16 August 2025.
[4] Chibuike Madubuegwu and others, ‘Resurgence of Military Regimes in West Africa: A Perspective Analysis’ [2025] Journal of Policy and Development Studies 44.
[5] Taiwo Adefisoye and Utibe Titus, ‘The Emergence of AEA States: A Positive Development in Tackling Insecurity in the Sahel?’ [2025] Security Science Journal 145.
[6] International Federation for Human Rights-FIDH, Civic Space and Human Rights Defenders in the Sahel: A Regional Convergence of Repressive Practices (International Federation for Human Rights-FIDH 2015)
[7] Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, ‘Alliance of Sahel States (AES): Yet Another Regional Bloc in West Africa’ (Centre for Democracy and Development, 25 March 2024) <https://www.cddwestafrica.org/blog/alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-yet-another-regional-bloc-in-west-africa/> accessed 16 August 2025.
[8] Hermine Sam, West Africa at a Crossroads of Partnerships (Policy Centre for the New South 2025) 6.
[9] Chris Ewokor, ‘Three Military-Run States Leave West African Bloc – What Will Change?’ (BBC News, 29 January 3025) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvd91j72eo.amp> accessed 17 August 2025; Timothy Obiezu, ‘Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso Officially Quit ECOWAS’ (VOA, 29 January 2025) <https://www.voanews.com/amp/west-africa-bloc-announces-formal-exit-of-three-junta-led-states-/7955666.html> accessed 17 August 2025.
[10] Salah Ben Hammou, ‘Coups in West Africa Have Five Things in Common: Knowing What they Are is Key to Defending Democracy’ (The Conversation, 6 July 2025) <https://theconversation.com/coups-in-west-africa-have-five-things-in-common-knowing-what-they-are-is-key-to-defending-democracy-258890> accessed 17 August 2025.
[11] International Crisis Group, ‘Defining a New Approach to the Sahel’s Military-led States’ (International Crisis Group, 22 May 2025) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-mali-niger/defining-new-approach-sahels-military-led-states> accessed 28 August 2025; Boubacar Haidara ‘Popular Support: The Only Basis of Legitimacy for West Africa’s New Military Regimes?’ [2024] Africa Today 97.
[12] Samuel Edet, Nwankwo Guzorochi, and Efefiong Asuquo, ‘Military Regimes in the Sahel as Recruitment Sergeants for Rebel Governance’ [2024] Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies 50.
[13] Sunny Vo, ‘Junta Rule in the Sahel: Decolonisation and Destabilisation’ (Harvard International Review, 25 January 2025) <https://hir.harvard.edu/author/sunny/> accessed 17 August 2025.
[14] Catherine Nziku and Beverly Ochieng, ‘The New Alliance of Sahel States and the Future of Africa’s Legacy Institutions’ (6 March 2025) <https://www.csis.org/podcasts/youth-bloom/new-alliance-sahel-states-and-future-africas-legacy-institutions> accessed 18 August 2025.
[15] Festus Aboagye, ‘The Withdrawal of AES from ECOWAS: An Opportunity for Re-evaluating Existing Instruments for Regional Integration?’ (Amani Africa, 31 January 2025) <https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-withdrawal-of-aes-from-ecowas-an-opportunity-for-re-evaluating-existing-instruments-for-regional-integraion/> accessed 17 August 2025; Editorial, ‘ECOWAS Loses Membership of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’ (DW, 29 January 2025) <https://amp.dw.com/en/ecowas-formally-loses-members-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger/a-71441211> accessed 17 August 2025.
