Introduction
According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey “Democracy at Risk – The People’s Perspective”, Africans continue to overwhelmingly reject one-party rule and prefer democracy to any other form of government. At the same time, less than half of Africans believe their countries are democratic, and only slightly more than one-third of them are satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries. As will be outlined in this blog post, this dissatisfaction is also a reflection of the way Africans experience multipartyism and how the latter is shaped by the constitutional and legal frameworks in which it operates. What follows is a brief summary of the main findings and recommendations for reform of a new comparative study entitled “Constitutionalisation of Political Parties and the State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa”.[1]
Registration requirements and other limitations
A first key finding of the study is that the constitutionalisation of political parties is the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, dedicated chapters in the constitution regulate political parties to some extent and outline their main rights and obligations. Moreover, many African countries make party status dependent on registration with the state.
Constitutional power-sharing arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa are often insufficient or inadequate. Particularistic interests based on ethnicity, religion or region play a major role in African party politics. The common constitutional response, namely to take an integrationist approach by prohibiting or ignoring these considerations, seems to have little or no effect. This is particularly evident when considering the widespread constitutional prohibition of ethnicity-based political parties, a prohibition which is nonetheless rarely used as a justification for actual party bans, probably due to its perceived sensitivity.
Although several sub-Saharan African countries require political parties to adhere to democratic principles or explicitly demand that they be internally democratic, the meaning of this often remains unclear in concrete terms. What is clear, though, is that even where such requirements exist, they do not prevent the widespread undemocratic practices that can be observed in many African countries.
Identified gaps and weaknesses
Apart from these findings concerning registration requirements and other regulations limiting the freedom of association of political parties, the study shows that regulations designed to hold ruling parties accountable are often insufficient. Where dedicated regulations exist to prevent the abuse of public resources for partisan purposes, a lack of proper enforcement often means that state resources can still be used indirectly to help the ruling party. In addition, although many constitutional systems in sub-Saharan Africa envision laws dedicated to party funding issues, their enactment is often still pending. Further gaps can be observed in the regulation of party spending: in some countries, there are no spending limits at all. In many other countries, such limits do exist, but are outdated, or the enforcement mechanisms are weak.
Although alliances of multiple parties under an umbrella name are a well-known phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, the rise of coalition governments in many countries that have long been ruled by a single party highlights the increased importance of formally recognising and regulating such cooperation. Gaps in these frameworks can be used by ruling parties to co-opt smaller opponents.
Opposition parties are often only weakly protected. In particular, while many constitutional frameworks recognise the position of an opposition leader, this seems to be largely symbolic and is generally limited to a parliamentary role. In addition, constitutional and legal frameworks aimed at protecting the members and supporters of these parties against intimidation, harassment and violence are either absent or not applied.
Another finding concerns political party oversight. While many sub-Saharan African countries have electoral management bodies or other fourth-branch institutions to oversee political parties, this is not always the case. Where party oversight bodies are indeed separate from the executive, their status, structures and governance are not always constitutionalised but left instead to statutory law, thus making them vulnerable to political interference. But even where this is the case, maintaining their independence from the executive is often challenging. It is hence interesting to note the different approach taken in some countries, where the independence of the electoral commission is ensured not through non-partisanship but through equal representation of party members as commissioners.
Lastly, the study shows that despite the existence of a broad range of international and African regional standards and bodies relevant for the regulation of political parties, their impact at the domestic level appears to be fairly limited. In addition, supranational enforcement of international and regional standards plays only a marginal role. Regional courts are rarely active, and when they are, they normally/usually don’t interfere substantially.
Possible Ways Forward
Against the background of these findings, what are possible ways forward that could lead towards more robust constitutional and legal frameworks regulating political parties in sub-Saharan Africa?
First, new ways should be considered to channel ethnic considerations in African party politics. Inspiration could be taken from Arend Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy to better manage ethnic diversity with measures that integrate and protect particularistic interests in the foundations of the political system. Lesser-known models to accommodate ethnic considerations, such as the so-called best-loser system that obtains in Mauritius, could be studied in more detail to draw lessons for other political systems on the continent.
Secondly, considering the undemocratic processes and structures that are widespread/prevalent among many African political parties, a strong argument can furthermore be made for the constitutionalisation of the requirement of internal political-party democracy, combined with strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Thirdly, party coalitions can provide/serve as a tool for the opposition to overcome fragmentation and join forces against ruling parties. In order to avoid uncertainties over the status and contents of such agreements, these could be made legally binding, with the basic features and requirements outlined in the agreements.
Fourthly, the legal frameworks regulating party financing need to be improved. Limitations on funding from abroad often work disproportionately against opposition parties and should be reconsidered. Where state funding does not already exist, the provision of such funds could reduce the reliance of parties on private funding and engender a more level playing field. To improve oversight of political-party financing, independent supervisory bodies need to be established or, where they already exist, strengthened.
Fifthly, the potential of regional and international standards could be leveraged more effectively. Initiatives such as the preparation of a study on the implementation of the Freedom of Association Guidelines by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights are welcome developments, but further specific guidance on the regulation of political parties would be important steps towards strengthening the existing constitutional and legal frameworks. Regional bodies, furthermore, could issue recommendations upon request on specific planned reforms touching on the constitutionalisation of political parties, such as the Venice Commission does for the member states of the Council of Europe. In addition, sub-regional and regional approaches to election observation could be developed and further harmonised. Provisions guaranteeing and protecting election observation by civil society organisations could enhance multipartyism and the integrity of election processes to rebuild trust among Africans in democracy.
[1] Charles M Fombad and Johannes Socher (eds), Constitutionalisation of Political Parties and the State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2025). The volume is available open access online at https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/en/document/view/detail/uuid/15ad2375-6c54-3989-b323-f2e38e565e9d.
