Digital Rights and State Surveillance in Africa: Balancing Security and Privacy in the Digital Age

Introduction

In Africa, governments are rapidly expanding their digital surveillance capabilities, investing in advanced technologies such as spyware, biometric databases, and real-time tracking systems. These tools, mostly imported from foreign companies with little transparency or accountability, are being used in ways that raise serious human rights concerns. This trend is not limited to one area; similar technologies are used to intercept private communications, monitor social media activity, and track the movements of activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. Although governments often justify these practices as necessary for national security, the increasing use of digital surveillance is encroaching on citizens’ fundamental rights to privacy, free expression, and political participation.

This widespread trend is driven not only by authoritarian impulses but also by massive state investments in digital infrastructure. Governments in Africa are investing billions of dollars in digital technologies to surveil their own citizens, like Nigeria.[ii] African governments justify these surveillance investments by citing specific national security objectives that are genuinely relevant to the continent’s challenges. These include counter-terrorism efforts against groups like Boko Haram in West Africa and Al-Shabaab in East Africa, securing porous borders to prevent human trafficking and irregular migration, combating transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, preventing cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and maintaining public order during emergencies. This article focuses particularly on how surveillance systems deployed for counter-terrorism, border security, and crime prevention often expand beyond their stated objectives to monitor civil society, political opposition, and ordinary citizens. While these security concerns are legitimate and require technological solutions, the critical question is whether governments can address these threats through surveillance while maintaining democratic accountability and constitutional protections for citizens’ rights.

As mentioned earlier, these digital surveillance tools are often used in ways that violate citizens’ fundamental human rights, which are protected by national constitutions, international conventions ratified by those African countries, and domestic laws. The use of digital surveillance to intercept emails, monitor mobile phones and social media activity, and track citizens’ movements and transactions gives governments and corporations unprecedented capacity for comprehensive, real-time surveillance of private lives. The rapid growth of rights-violating surveillance and its use to monitor peaceful protests, independent journalism, opposition politicians, judges, and activists is contributing to the shrinking of civic space, which hampers citizens’ ability to participate freely in democratic discussions, political debates, and inclusive decision-making.[iii]

This article examines how African countries are utilizing digital surveillance in ways that compromise human rights. It highlights the urgent need to strike a balance between state security goals and the protection of digital rights in a rapidly evolving digital landscape.

Understanding Digital Rights in the African Context

Digital rights extend human rights into the digital realm.[iv] Among these rights are the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, access to information, data protection, and non-discrimination online.[v] In Africa, these rights face increasing threats from the growth of digital identity systems, biometric surveillance, and data-driven governance tools, and are at risk of being unprotected.

Many African countries require mandatory biometric registration to access SIM cards, healthcare, education, and government services. While this can enhance service delivery and inclusion, it often lacks legal protections, risking individuals’ privacy and consent. Over 50 African countries now enforce mandatory SIM registration, often without clear rules for data protection or independent oversight.[vi] Similarly, as with other emerging technologies, the use of digital ID systems also poses a risk to privacy and data security.

As governments around the world collect and process data for their digital identity databases, the privacy and data protection rights of their citizens will inevitably be affected. This is exemplified by the decision of the Kenyan High Court in October 2021, which halted the Huduma Namba project due to insufficient protection for citizens’ data. HUDUMA Namba was Kenya’s controversial national digital identity card system that aimed to create a centralized database of all Kenyan citizens’ personal information, including biometric data. The High Court declared the rollout of Huduma Namba illegal in October 2021, citing a conflict with the Data Protection Act.[vii] When courts do this, it is a good thing because it will force governments to build and design their digital identity systems with the right safety features.

Exclusion is another critical issue in digital rights. Millions of Africans, particularly women, older adults, and rural residents, lack essential identity documents, such as birth certificates, which are required to obtain digital IDs. In Uganda, about one-third of adults could not access healthcare and services in 2021 due to the absence of national ID cards.[viii] Not only that, but also in Nigeria, Omoyele Sowore, a human rights activist and former presidential candidate, found that the Nigerian government had deactivated his biometric identification in January 2022. This meant that his national identification card, permanent voter card, foreign passport, and driver’s licence were among the documents to be deactivated, preventing him from travelling, driving, or voting.[ix] This undermines the right to non-discrimination and digital inclusion, further worsening existing social inequalities.

In this context, digital rights should be prioritized in digital transformation policies. The African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy (2020–2030) promotes inclusive and trusted digital ID systems but faces the challenge of ensuring these systems uphold human dignity and prevent misuse.[x] This is crucial because when digital ID systems are designed without proper safeguards, they can easily become tools of surveillance and control rather than empowerment.

The Rise of State Surveillance in Africa and Legal and Ethical Challenges

David Lyon describes surveillance as ‘the focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection, or direction’. These broad definitions of surveillance make it clear that surveillance can be socially beneficial or harmful.[xi] The key is finding the right balance. Surveillance can protect society from real threats like terrorism and serious crimes, but it becomes dangerous when governments use it to silence critics or control the everyday behavior of law-abiding citizens.

There have been relatively few studies of digital surveillance in other regions of Africa, and Africa is underrepresented in the literature when compared to other continents. Recent studies in Southern Africa like the study of Munoriyarwa and Admire Mare from the University of Johannesburg, in a book they called Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa: Policies, Politics and Practices[xii] have addressed the implications of surveillance law on citizens’ rights, the introduction of public space surveillance, resistance strategies by those targeted by surveillance, and the use of policing technologies for surveillance. Though these authors clearly document specific surveillance technologies in Southern Africa, there has been relatively little analysis in other regions of the continent. See, however, Spaces for Change in Nigeria.[xiii] This research gap is concerning because, without proper documentation and analysis of how surveillance systems operate across different African contexts, it becomes much harder for civil society groups and policymakers to identify problems early and push for necessary reforms before these systems become deeply established.

The increasing involvement of private actors, along with fragmented biometric databases and mandatory SIM linkages, complicates accountability and oversight despite regional frameworks like the AU Digital ID Framework, where Different African countries are increasingly implementing digital identity programmes.[xiv] In some cases, they are funded by foreign donor agencies and partners for a variety of purposes, ranging from border control.[xv] Countries like Rwanda, Cameroon, and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, have taken measures to modernise their identity systems. There is also noticeable cooperation at the regional level on the biometric identity system. In West Africa, Nigeria announced plans to implement the ECOWAS biometric card in 2019[xvi]. Though these technology helps in the advancement of countries, they pose significant threats to digital rights, but these systems are now being used in broader surveillance practices, fueling fears about civic space and government overreach.[xvii] This trend is particularly worrying because when multiple parties are involved, foreign donors, private companies, and governments, no one takes full responsibility when citizens’ data is misused or their rights are violated

The Way Forward to Balance Security and Privacy

To establish a rights-respecting surveillance system in Africa, countries must follow key legal principles, including legality, necessity, proportionality, and independent oversight. Surveillance measures should be based on clear laws, used only when necessary, and proportionate to their objectives, typically national security or crime prevention. Oversight mechanisms like independent data protection agencies and judicial review are essential to prevent misuse. Collaborating through the African Union’s Digital ID Framework and engaging civil society can help set standards and promote rights-based practices across borders.[xviii] The reality is that without these safeguards, surveillance systems quickly turn from protective tools into weapons that governments use against their own people but when these principles are properly implemented, countries can actually fight crime and terrorism while still respecting their citizens’ fundamental rights.

There are promising signs on the horizon. Though some of their downfalls have been mentioned about but Laws like Kenya’s Data Protection Act (2019) and Nigeria’s NDPR (2019) provide crucial legal protections and give regulators, such as Kenya’s Data Protection Commissioner and Nigeria’s Data Protection Commission, the power to act. These can be used as examples for other African countries. International advocacy, growing digital literacy, and public demands for transparency can also push governments to adopt more responsible surveillance practices. As Munoriyarwa and Mare point out, grassroots efforts like lawsuits, media coverage, and community engagement are driving digital governance reforms. Combining these local strategies with robust legal frameworks provides a practical approach to strike a balance between national security and the protection of fundamental digital rights.

Conclusion

This paper shows that digital identity systems and surveillance technologies are spreading rapidly across Africa. They offer improved services and enhanced national security, but often come with a significant cost to individual privacy, social inclusion, and democratic rights. Inadequate data protection laws, insufficient oversight, and unclear practices lead to exclusion, abuse, and unmonitored surveillance. The key question is not whether Africa should adopt digital innovation, but how to do so in a responsible manner. A rights-based approach to digital governance, grounded in legality, transparency, proportionality, and accountability, is vital. Stronger legal safeguards, independent oversight bodies, and public awareness campaigns must work in tandem with new technologies. Civil society and regional cooperation also play critical roles. While balancing security and privacy, African governments must ensure that digital advancements do not erode human dignity and democratic freedoms.

[1] Florian Reynaud and Phineas Rueckert, ‘Rwandan Regime Used Pegasus Spyware on Opponents and Allies for Years’ (Le Monde, 29 May 2024) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/05/29/opponents-and-allies-of-rwandan-regime-have-been-targeted-with-pegasus-spyware-for-years_6673041_4.html> accessed 25 August 2025.

[2] Institute of Development Studies, ‘Nigeria spending billions of dollars on harmful surveillance of citizens’ <https://www.ids.ac.uk/press-releases/nigeria-spending-billions-of-dollars-on-harmful-surveillance-of-citizens/ accessed> 18 September 2025.

[3] Tony Roberts and Admire Mare, Digital Surveillance in Africa: Power, Agency and Rights (Bloomsbury 2025) 1.

[4] T Mohamed Ali and others, ‘Surveillance Law in Africa: a Review of Six Countries’ (Institute of Development Studies, 2021).

[5] Ibid.

[6] GSMA, Mandatory SIM Registration in Africa (2021) <https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/resources/sim-card-registration-laws-in-sub-saharan-africa/> accessed 27 August 2025

[7] Kenya’s Huduma Namba: Ambition Fraught with Risk’ (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative) <https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/kenyas-huduma-namba-ambition-fraught-with-risk/?lang=fr> accessed 25 August 2025

[8] ‘Uganda’s ID scheme excludes nearly a third from healthcare, says report’ (The Guardian, 9 June 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/09/ugandas-id-scheme-excludes-nearly-a-third-from-healthcare-says-report> accessed 25 August 2025

[9] Nigeria spending billions of dollars on harmful surveillance of citizens’ (Institute of Development Studies, 27 September 2023) <https://www.ids.ac.uk/press-releases/nigeria-spending-billions-of-dollars-on-harmful-surveillance-of-citizens/> accessed 25 August 2025

[10]African Union, Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030) <https://au.int/en/documents/20200518/digital-transformation-strategy-africa-2020-2030> accessed 26th August 2025.

[11] David Lyon, ‘Surveillance, Power, and Everyday Life’ in Chrisanthi Avgerou et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies (OUP 2007).

[12] Munoriyarwa A and Mare A, Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa: Policies, Politics and Practices (Springer, 2023).

[13]Ibezim Ohaeri et al, Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria, Action Group on Free Civic Space (2021).

[14] African countries embracing biometrics, digital IDs’ (Africa Renewal) <https://africarenewal.un.org/en/magazine/african-countries-embracing-biometrics-digital-ids> accessed 27 August 2025.

[15]‘Europe’s Shady Funds to Border Forces in the Sahel’ (Privacy International) <https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3223/europes-shady-funds-border-forces-sahel> accessed 27 August 2025.

[16] Aishat Salami and Ridwan Oloyede, Digital Identity, Surveillance, and Data Protection (2024) 135–139.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.