Introduction
The current moment is often described as an escalation. In truth, it is something else: a revelation. International politics, or to put it more clearly: the most powerful players in international politics are now openly expressing what has long been hidden behind diplomatic phrases, moral appeals and the narrative of a “rules-based international order” (which of course refers to international law). This order applies – but only where it does not affect the central interests of the powerful. Where it does, it is stretched, circumvented or ignored. It is not morality that decides, but power. This reality is not new. What is new is that it is hardly concealed anymore. A quote from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio illustrates this dynamic quite accurately:
“I don’t think that the European Union gets to determine what international law is, and what they certainly don’t get to determine is how the United States defends its national security. The United States is under attack from organised criminal narco-terrorists in our hemisphere, and the President is responding in defence of our country.”[1]
For Africa, this disclosure is not just part of an abstract academic discourse. It directly affects the continent. In particular, those states that are beginning not only to question old dependencies, but also to take very concrete measures to break up power structures and renew them in line with Afrocentric interests. Specifically, I have in mind Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, which have ended foreign military presences [2], are pushing back Western corporations such as Barrick [3] and initiating new strategic alliances such as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)[4]. On the one hand, these are actions that, in my opinion, were long overdue. On the other hand, these actions will certainly upset the powerful players in our world.
But let us get back to the current events and international law. The central question I have been asking myself for some time is: Can international law, itself shaped by colonial power relations, function as an instrument of postcolonial liberation – and if so, under what conditions?
International Law is not Altruism
To discuss this question, I would like to begin by quoting German international law scholar Prof. Kai Ambos, who said the following in a recent interview published on the occasion of the US attack on Venezuela:
“But it’s true, it’s not enough to just invoke international law. Words are not enough. Europe must finally become sovereign – it needs political sovereignty, military sovereignty, digital sovereignty. Anyone who still hasn’t understood this, with this US administration, is beyond help.”[5]
This sentence destroys a central illusion: international law does not work without power. For Europe, this realisation is painful. For Africa, it is existential. If even Europe – economically strong, institutionally well integrated, politically (quite) influential – recognises that law without actual sovereignty and power is meaningless, then this applies to Africa to an even greater extent. International law is not a moral gift. It is primarily an instrument for safeguarding one’s own interests.
Africa’s Paradoxical Dependence on International Law
Africa is more dependent on international law than many other regions – and at the same time least able to enforce it. Many African states are militarily fragmented, economically dependent, and politically vulnerable individually. A prominent example here is the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the Kivu region along the border with Rwanda, armed groups such as the March 23 Movement (M23) and others control large areas and fight the national army, contributing to a fragmented security landscape that the state cannot fully manage. These dynamics have been intensified by support from neighboring Rwanda for some militias, making state control in North and South Kivu particularly weak.[6] Economically, the DRC remains heavily dependent on external support: it receives large amounts of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, and the United Nations peacekeeping mission MONUSCO continues to operate with over 12,000 personnel to help stabilize the country, illustrating that core security and development functions still rely significantly on international actors.[7]
The weaker a state is, the greater its need for clear rules that are, in the best case, universally accepted and obeyed. In fact, the aforementioned deficits prevent rule violations from having real consequences. African states thus often function merely as addressees of an international legal order that binds them without effectively protecting them. In this sense, they are among the wretched of this order: regulated, sanctionable, legally bound – but structurally without the power to enforce the law themselves or punish violations of it.
The Continent’s Externalised Order
Another key point is rarely clearly stated: Africa has historically adopted international law as an externalised order. Standards were imported, institutions legitimised from outside, enforcement outsourced to international actors. International law was invoked, but not controlled.
As this article is not intended to show the extent to which international law still reproduces colonial continuities today, I do not wish to dwell on this point. Anyone interested in this topic is welcome to consult international law scholars researching in the field of Third World Approaches to International Law.[8]
Revelation Instead of Escalation
As I said, what we are currently witnessing is not the collapse of the international order, but the collapse of its moral narrative. The new openness of Western rhetoric makes several points clear:
- The sovereignty of states without actual power remains fragile.
- International law standards are applied and interpreted selectively.
- The precedential nature of violating international law is deliberately accepted.
- Protection is never guaranteed.
This is a warning signal for African states that are beginning to act more independently. Sovereign decisions will not be seen as legitimate reorganisation, but as a threat to existing power structures. The AES around Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré must be particularly careful here. The mask has finally fallen. Not because someone tore it off, but because it is simply no longer needed.
What Conclusions Africa Must Draw
If, as Prof Kai Ambos notes, words, or more precisely, invoking international law, are not enough, then this applies to Africa just as much as it does to Europe. Probably even to a greater extent. Africa must understand international law as an instrument, not as an invocation. It must actively formulate its own legal positions, provide legally sound justification for terminating treaties and create its own precedents. Moral appeals without enforcement power remain inconsequential. Individual states remain vulnerable. Blocs generate costs. Regional alliances need common positions under international law, coordinated security doctrines and collective red lines. An attack on one state must automatically affect several. Africa is losing not only militarily and economically, but also legally. International law is a resource of power. Without its own think tanks, lawyers and strategic expertise, the continent will remain reactive. I cannot emphasise this enough: TWAIL must contribute to a global reorganisation.
Nevertheless, I am by no means naive. Anyone who has closely followed recent geopolitical developments understands very well that even the most careful work of TWAIL scholars and even the most elaborate Afrocentric international legal order will not suffice if violations of the law remain without consequences.
What remains crucial is genuine sovereignty and tangible political power. Without both, norms become well-sounding texts, but not effective instruments. I would therefore like to make it clear that I am well aware that no matter how radical, emancipatory, or “African” international law is formulated, African states need real power resources and actual sovereignty in order to sanction violations of the law in a painful manner.
Based on this thought, the following questions arise:
What Does Sovereignty mean? What Does Power mean?
One could certainly fill entire Books discussing this question; however I will keep my remarks brief and therefore refer to a definition by Prof. George Duke.
Sovereignty here does not mean self-sufficiency or isolation (at least not in the long term). It means the ability to identify one’s own interests, organise collectively, and defend oneself against resistance — oriented toward justice, peace, and the common good represented by the political community.[9]
The global order is not a space of moral equality, but a system of competing power blocs. Some are more powerful, some less – but all those that matter act collectively. Africa is not yet such a bloc. This is precisely where the strategic shortcoming lies. Effective bloc formation to enforce global interests must include the following components:
- Military sovereignty: Military sovereignty does not mean aggression, but credibility. It encompasses territorial control, regional security cooperation and a minimum level of deterrence capability. Without this, no law will be respected.
- Digital soverignty: Digital dependency is a new form of structural foreign rule. Control over data, infrastructure and narratives today determines political capacity to act – often long before conflicts become openly visible.
- Economic sovereignty: Economic sovereignty does not mean isolation (at least in the long term), but rather power to negotiate. Regional value creation, control of strategic resources and collective market positions are crucial. Individual states are vulnerable to intimidation. Blocs are not.
- Political sovereignty: Political sovereignty begins with clarity: identifying common interests, prioritising them and representing them in a unified manner.
No single African state will be able to compete with global powers such as the US, China or Russia in the short to medium term. But an African bloc can. Not immediately. Not without conflict. But in the long term – if efforts are made to achieve this. Decolonisation in the 21st century does not mean symbolic politics, but institutional strength and strategic patience to sustainably bundle collective power.
Conclusion
International law has never been altruistic. The “rules-based order” has never been neutral. The mask of a supposedly fair playing field has finally fallen.
The question is not whether Africa is part of this game – it already is. The question is only whether it will remain a ball to be kicked around or become a player. Today, sovereignty means bundling power, defining interests and making international rules actually enforceable.
[1] Marco Rubio, Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to the Press (U.S. Department of State, 12 November 2025) <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/secretary-of-state-marco-remarks-to-the-press> accessed 8 January 2026.
[2] Last French troops leave Niger, ending decades of Sahel missions (France 24, 22 December 2023) <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231222-🔴-last-french-troops-leave-niger-ending-decade-long-operation-in-the-sahel> accessed 8 January 2026.
[3] Exclusive: Barrick to suspend operations in Mali after Gold seized (Reuters, 13 January 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/mali-started-flying-gold-stocks-out-barrick-site-saturday-sources-say-2025-01-13/> accessed 8 January 2025.
[4] Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger sign Sahel security pact (Reuters, 16 September 2023) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/> accessed 8 January 2025.
[5] Kai Ambos: It is not enough to merely invoke international law (Zeit, 4 January 2026) <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2026-01/kai-ambos-voelkerrecht-usa-angriff-venezuela> accessed 8 January 2026.
[6] Lesley Myers, Crisis in DRC: UN peacekeepers protecting civilians – and themselves – from large-scale offensive operations by M23 rebels (United Nations, 29 January 2025) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/crisis-drc-un-peacekeepers-protecting-civilians-and-themselves-large-scale-offensive-operations-m23> accessed 8 January 2026.
[7] See: MONUSCO Fact Sheet.
[8] Feel free to read the following piece by Prof. James Thuo Gathii on this topic: “Africa,” Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Bardo Fassbender, Anne Peters, Simone Peter and Daniel Hogger (eds.), Oxford University Press (2012).
[9] George Duke, ‘Sovereignty and the common good’ (2019) 17(1) IJCL <https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/17/1/66/5485951> accessed 8 January 2026.
