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Symbols Without Substance? Interrogating the Potential of the African Union Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Girls

Prelude to the AUCEVAWG

UN Women reports that in 2023, approximately 51,100 women and girls worldwide were murdered by an intimate partner or family member.[1] The highest in any region, 21,700 of those deaths occurred in Africa, according to the same report. These figures capture only femicide, ‘the most extreme manifestation of gender-based violence against women and girls’ (VAWG).[2] Africa also has the highest number of girls [3]who have experienced rape or sexual assault before turning 18 – 79 million, according to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund.[4] Amid such statistics, it is unsurprising that Africa has seen waves of protests against VAWG in Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria in the last year.[5]

Consequently, the African Union’s (AU) adoption of the AU Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (AUCEVAWG or the Convention) in February 2025 has been widely celebrated. The AU joins the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe, which have adopted the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women and the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, respectively, as the third regional system to adopt a treaty on eliminating VAWG.

There is no global treaty on VAWG. In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the non-binding Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) does not explicitly deal with VAWG. The AU’s Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) does deal with the subject, yet the AUCEVAWG was deemed necessary because VAWG ‘continues unabated in Africa, despite the existence of global, continental, and regional instruments’, as its preamble notes. The persistence of VAWG despite existing prohibitions of such acts raises questions about the AUCEVAWG’s potential to yield meaningful progress. This article briefly reflects on this issue.

The AUCEVAWG

Despite the sometimes-self-congratulatory tone of AU press releases about the Convention, its provisions are not entirely groundbreaking. Many echo those of other international human rights instruments, including the Maputo Protocol.  While the Maputo Protocol elaborates an expansive regime of women’s rights across various contexts, the Convention addresses the specific issue of VAWG with mixed results. Nonetheless, the core of the Convention – that women and girls have the right to be free from violence and states are obligated to prevent, punish, and eradicate VAWG is covered by Articles 3 and 4 of the Maputo Protocol.

However, the Convention introduces some innovations. Its definition of ‘Violence Against Women and Girls’, in Article 1(k), adapts the Maputo Protocol’s definition, by acknowledging that VAWG occurs in cyberspace — a first for a treaty on the subject. Also, the Convention expands the definition of VAWG to encompass ‘transition, post-conflict, disaster, and post-disaster situations. Though not defined, ‘disaster’ could include natural disasters, opening doors to enforcing women’s rights during environmental catastrophes.

Significant among the Convention’s Guiding Principles is its victim-centered approach, which states are to uphold in providing access to justice for survivors, through fair rules of evidence, witness protection, data protection, and other measures (Articles 6(b) and 12). The Convention’s preamble articulates an intersectional approach, recognising that VAWG is interconnected with discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, age, disability, and other factors. Therefore, state parties must consider the heightened risks faced by those with multiple vulnerabilities (Article 7(1)). One facet of intersectionality that the Convention omits is sexual orientation and gender identity. This is expected given the AU’s infamous aversion to LGBTQ rights.[6] Nevertheless, the AU’s continued relegation of this issue is disappointing, since ‘LGBTQ-phobia’ is directly linked to torture, ‘corrective’ rape, and murder. The Convention’s treatment of VAWG in armed conflict is equally lacking. Article 11 of the Maputo Protocol requires states to respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and prosecute sexual violence against women as war crimes, genocide, and/or crimes against humanity. In contrast, the Convention fails to directly deal with conflict-related sexual violence and reaffirm its prohibition under IHL, international human rights law, and international criminal law.

Women and girls are also to be protected from violence in their workplaces through the promotion of safe and enabling work environments (Articles 8-9). States are required to prevent VAWG by ensuring that customs, traditions, and religious considerations are not used to justify such acts (Article 10(a)(ii)). They must establish minimum standards for gender-responsive reporting procedures, legal aid, protection orders, safe housing, and medical and psychosocial services for survivors. They are also tasked with fostering women’s participation in all areas of development and, protecting their property rights (Article 11).

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has the mandate to interpret the Convention and may refer matters to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) (Article 14). This arrangement has sparked widespread criticism as the ACHPR already faces numerous challenges, including the non-implementation of its decisions by states, its limited resources, and undue interference with its operations by the AU Assembly.[7] The arrangement mars the AUCEVAWG with one of the Maputo Protocol’s major weaknesses: the lack of a dedicated, independent mechanism to monitor its implementation.

Overall, the AUCEVAWG builds upon CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol, the AU Guidelines on Combating Sexual Violence and its Consequences in Africa, and other instruments to form a fairly comprehensive, but flawed, framework for tackling VAWG that complements but does not radically advance the existing normative framework.

The Implementation Hurdle

The AUCEVAWG will enter into force 30 days after 15 AU member states deposit their ratification instruments (Article 17(1)). Given this low threshold, the Convention could come into effect later this year. Djibouti, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Gambia have signed the Convention.[8] However, it is still early to celebrate.

Africa has a poor record on women’s rights treaties. For example, 22 years after its adoption, Egypt and Morocco have not signed the Maputo Protocol. Seven state parties have yet to ratify the treaty, and some have lodged reservations that undermine women’s rights that intersect with VAWG, including those related to marriage and reproductive rights.[9] Most have failed to take concrete steps to implement the treaty. The Maputo Protocol requires states to submit biennial reports on its implementation, a requirement also applicable under the AUCEVAWG (Article 26, Maputo Protocol; Article 14, AUCEVAWG). Most states, including early AUCEVAWG signatories like Burundi, DRC, Liberia, and Gambia, are overdue on their reports.[10] Why would these states treat the AUCEVAWG any differently?

At the AU’s last count, only 34 states had a National Action Plan (NAP) on VAWG or gender-based violence, and fewer had NAPs targeting issues like female genital mutilation and child marriage. Many, like Nigeria’s NAP on Women, Peace, and Security (2017-2020), were outdated .[11] Others still lacked the budgetary allocations to actualise them. For example, although 20 states had NAPs on ending child marriage, only Guinea and Zambia had required budgets.[12]

Beyond these challenges, there are concerns about the limited access to judicial remedies when states neglect their obligations under the AUCEVAWG, since most AU states have not made the declaration, under Article 34(6) of the  AfCHPR Protocol,  that allows the court to hear cases filed directly by individuals and non-governmental organisations. Five of the 12 states that have made the declaration have withdrawn it, Tunisia being the latest in March 2025.[13] The ACHPR could refer matters to the AfCHPR, but it has historically been hesitant to explore this, lest it be viewed as weaker than the AfCHPR, among other reasons.[14]

Making the AUCEVAWG Work

The AUCEVAWG is certainly a symbolic victory for the AU. It signals a commitment to eradicating VAWG. However, the record of AU member states on this issue threatens to dampen hopes about what the AUCEVAWG could achieve. Still, it is too early to declare the Convention a failure. To avoid this, the AU and its member states must demonstrate the necessary political will. This means holding states accountable to adopt domestic laws and policies that truly align with their obligations under global and regional treaties on VAWG.

Moreover, the provisions of the AUCEVAWG can only be fulfilled through adequate funding. States must allocate sufficient resources in their budgets to ministries responsible for addressing VAWG, such as ministries of health, justice, labor, and women’s affairs. Coordination among these ministries, relevant departments, and agencies must be strengthened to ensure harmony.

These circumstances present opportunities for civil society organisations (CSOs) to take on various roles to ensure the Convention’s effectiveness. Beyond advocating for ratification, they can advocate that domestic laws and policies are framed to fill the AUCEVAWG’s gaps, while also demanding progressive interpretation of the AUCEVAWG at the ACHPR and the AfCHPR. States must cooperate with CSOs, after all, the AUCEVAWG requires them to strengthen, engage with, and protect women and girls’ human rights defenders fighting against VAWG (Article 11 (2)).


[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and UN Women, Femicides in 2023: Global Estimates of Intimate Partner/Family Member Femicides (United Nations 2024) 11.

[2] ibid 10.

[3] UNICEF, ‘Over 79 Million Girls and Women in Sub-Saharan Africa Subjected to Rape or Sexual Assault as Children’ (UNICEF, 10 October 2024) <https://www.unicef.org/esa/press-releases/over-79-million-girls-and-women-sub-saharan-africa-subjected-rape-or-sexual-assault> accessed 19 August 2025.

[4] Monicah Mwangi and Aaron Ross, ‘Kenyan Police Fire Teargas At Protesters Marching Against Femicide’ (Reuters, 10 December 2024) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyan-police-fire-teargas-protesters-marching-against-femicide-2024-12-10/> accessed 19 August 2025; Mogomotsi Magome, ‘Crowds Demonstrate Against Gender-Based Violence in South Africa After Alleged Rape of 7-Year-Old’ (AP News, 11 April 2025) <https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-rape-protest-violence-women-5442fd87789ee6251254a1df5024e096> accessed 19 August 2025; ‘Anambra Women Protest Against Gender-Based Violence, Ritual Killings’ (Premium Times, 14 March 2025) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/780860-anambra-women-protest-against-gender-based-violence-ritual-killings.html?tztc=1> accessed 27 August 2025.

[5] Mariel Reiss, ‘Advocating for Human Rights of LGBTIQ+ Persons in Multilevel Governance Systems’ (2024) 20 Journal of Civil Society 269, 271.

[6] Chairman Okoloise, ‘Circumventing Obstacles to the Implementation of Recommendations by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018)18 African Human Rights Law Journal 27, 45.

[7] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,‘Joint Press Statement on the Signing of the African Union Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls by Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia and The Gambia’ (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 18 July 2025) <https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2025-07-18/signing-african-union-convention-ending-violence-against-women-girls> accessed 23 August 2025.

[8] List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37077-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_HUMAN_AND_PEOPLES_RIGHTS_ON_THE_RIGHTS_OF_WOMEN_IN_AFRICA.pdf> accessed 23 August 2025; Solidarity for African Women’s Rights, ‘Protocol Watch’ (Solidarity for African Women’s Rights) <https://soawr.org/protocol-watch/> accessed 29 August 2025.

[9] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘States Reporting Status’ <https://achpr.au.int/en/states-reporting-status> accessed 23 August 2025.

[10] African Union, Regional Evidence-Based Mapping and Assessment on the Status of Domestication and Enforcement of Laws and Policies, and National Action Plans in Line with Global and Regional Human Rights Commitments on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (African Union, 2023) 10 and 90.

[11] Ibid 45.

[12] African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Declarations’ <https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/declarations/> accessed 24 September 2025.

[13] African Union (n 10) 92-93.

[14]Ibid 91-92.

Author

  • Adenike Akande

    Adenike Akande is a legal practitioner based in Lagos, Nigeria. She is a member of the International Law Association (Nigerian Branch).

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