Introduction
Ethiopia is the second-most populous landlocked country in Africa, following Nigeria.[1] Historically, Ethiopia had access to the Red Sea for an extended period, iuntil Eritrea gained independence in 1993, which was achieved through a referendum. Since becoming landlocked, Ethiopia has faced multifaceted challenges due to the absence of a sustainable and regulated sea outlet, despite its heavy reliance on Djibouti’s ports for maritime trade.[2] This dependency has proven economically burdens, with Ethiopia incurring an estimated $1.6 billion annually in port fees. [3] Moreover, Ethiopia’s landlocked status has heightened its national security vulnerabilities, exposing it to both emerging and entrenched external powers that establish military bases along the Red Sea. Given these dynamics, it is essential to examine Ethiopia’s prospects for navigating the legal frameworks governing landlocked nations and the broader geopolitical challenges it faces in its pursuit of Red Sea access.
International Laws on the Rights of Landlocked States
The international community has developed various legal instruments over different periods to address the rights of landlocked states. These instruments aim to balance the interests of both landlocked and coastal states by establishing mechanisms for transit rights, trade facilitation, and security considerations. International law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides a legal framework that enables landlocked states to access maritime routes through negotiated trans it arrangements with coastal nations.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) establishes, under Article 125, that landlocked states have the right of access to and from the sea for trade and economic activities. However, this right must be exercised through agreements with transit states. Notably, the provision explicitly limits access to commercial and economic purposes, excluding military and security-related objectives. To complement this right, Article 126 imposes an obligation on transit states to facilitate the movement of goods and people across their territories without imposing unnecessary restrictions.[4] In practice, Ethiopia’s current transit arrangement with Djibouti aligns with this provision, as Djibouti does not impose additional taxes on Ethiopian goods in transit. Additionally, under international law, transit states are prohibited from ordering customs duties on goods merely passing through their jurisdiction.[5]
Beyond transit rights, Article 69 of UNCLOS grants landlocked states the right to equitable participation in the exploitation of marine resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal states.[6] For instance, Mali and Burkina Faso have formal agreements with Senegal, allowing them access to marine resources despite their landlocked status. In addition, Article 254 recognizes the right of landlocked states to participate in marine scientific research and benefit from global and regional initiatives in marine conservation, ensuring that they are not excluded from scientific advancements and international environmental protection efforts.[7]
Ethiopia’s Quest for Red Sea Access: A Legal Analysis Under UNCLOS (1982)
Ethiopia signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 and ratified it in 2012, yet it has not deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General. Consequently, the provisions of the Convention do not formally apply to Ethiopia. Besides, this right has not attained the status of customary international law, meaning Ethiopia cannot claim it as a legal entitlement without ratifying the relevant conventions, such as the UNCLOS. [8] Instead, Ethiopia’s access to the sea remains subject to bilateral agreements with coastal states, rather than an inherent right under international law.
Although Ethiopia cannot invoke UNCLOS as a legal basis for claiming access to the Red Sea without being a party to the convention, no coastal state in the region has explicitly rejected the principle that landlocked states are entitled to sea access. Instead of legal objections, the primary resistance to Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations arises from security concerns, historical disputes, and political mistrust in the Horn of Africa.
Thus, for Ethiopia to achieve sustainable access to the Red Sea, it must first ratify UNCLOS to formally recognize the legal framework governing maritime rights. However, ratification alone does not guarantee access. Ethiopia must also negotiate and conclude a bilateral or regional agreement with a coastal state to secure transit rights, ensuring a legally recognized and stable arrangement for maritime access. However, the UNCLOS framework has inherent limitations. It does not provide clear mechanisms for compelling non-cooperative coastal states to grant transit rights, leaving disputes to be resolved through political and diplomatic channels. Consequently, the effectiveness of Ethiopia’s claim to maritime access hinges not only on legal principles but also on strategic negotiations, regional alliances, and economic diplomacy. The interplay between legal entitlements and geopolitical realities means that access to the Red Sea is as much a matter of statecraft as it is of international law.
Ethiopia’s Pursuit of Red Sea Access: Challenges and Opportunities
Geopolitical Challenges
Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the Red Sea is fraught with numerous geopolitical challenges. The most significant of these challenges stems from the recent state of relations between Ethiopia’s administration and Eritrea. The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has undergone significant shifts since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. His administration initiated a rapid rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, leading to a historic thaw in relations. However, this newfound alliance soon evolved into a strong military partnership during the conflict between the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). [9] Despite this initial cooperation, the relationship between the two states deteriorated following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on November 2, 2022, which brought an end to the war in northern Ethiopia.
The unregulated nature of the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship presents a formidable challenge to Ethiopia’s aspirations for maritime access through Eritrean territory. The historical animosities stemming from the 1998 war, coupled with ideological and strategic differences between Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki, further complicate matters. This shift in relations has prompted Egypt to form an alliance with Eritrea to challenge Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea, largely due to Egypt’s opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This alliance has added complexity to regional dynamics. Reports indicate that Cairo has bolstered its military and diplomatic ties with Asmara, capitalizing on Eritrea’s strategic position along the Red Sea to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing influence.[10] This alignment raises significant concerns about the potential for regional instability and the escalating militarization of the Red Sea basin.
Secondly, Gulf states such as the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are actively engaged in shaping the region’s power dynamics, further complicating Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions. Ethiopia’s quest to secure maritime access through the Red Sea is perceived as a potential threat to the existing balance of power in the region. As Ethiopia emerges as a new actor with fresh ambitions and strengthened alliances, established regional powers are likely to view its aspirations with suspicion. Given Ethiopia’s close ties with the UAE, it is expected to face significant resistance from Saudi Arabia and its allies, making its pursuit of a sea outlet a complex and contentious endeavor. Moreover, the restrained policy approach of the Trump administration should a similar strategy be reintroduced in the future could exacerbate tensions among regional and global players, leaving Ethiopia to navigate an increasingly challenging geopolitical landscape. Against this backdrop, Ethiopia’s efforts to secure Red Sea access will face formidable geopolitical headwinds, with major powers closely monitoring and responding to its moves.
Hopes and Possible Pathways
Ethiopia’s ambition to access the Red Sea can be realized through several strategic pathways, each grounded in the country’s diplomatic, economic, and regional influence. Key to this vision is positioning Ethiopia as a diplomatic hub, leveraging its established status to further strengthen its regional influence. The pursuit of soft power, regional stability, economic integration, and energy diplomacy also offers viable avenues for Ethiopia to achieve its long-term goal of Red Sea access. If effectively executed, these strategies could transform Ethiopia’s aspirations into a reality, solidifying its role as a responsible regional leader.
Addis Ababa, often referred to as Africa’s diplomatic epicenter, exemplifies Ethiopia’s enduring commitment to regional and continental integration. As the headquarters of the African Union (AU), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA), and numerous other international organizations, Ethiopia has significantly influenced Africa’s political, economic, and security frameworks. The country’s instrumental role in the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, alongside its steadfast advocacy for African unity and self-determination, has earned it considerable diplomatic capital across the continent. This legacy of support for decolonization and pan-African solidarity provides Ethiopia with a strategic advantage in its quest for Red Sea access. By leveraging this diplomatic goodwill, Ethiopia can present its maritime aspirations as a legitimate economic necessity, central to regional stability and development, rather than a unilateral territorial expansion.
In pursuit of this, Ethiopia can employ soft power to build regional consensus on equitable access to vital maritime trade routes. Drawing upon its historical role in advancing African unity, Ethiopia can frame its Red Sea ambitions within the context of regional cooperation and mutual benefit. Given the Red Sea’s importance as a global shipping corridor, Ethiopia’s access to this critical route should not be seen in narrow bilateral or regional terms but as an issue of broader international economic significance. By fostering cooperation, Ethiopia can shift perceptions, positioning its Red Sea access as a matter of collective interest rather than individual gain.
Ethiopia’s leadership in peacekeeping and counterterrorism initiatives further enhances its credibility as a stabilizing force in the region. The Red Sea corridor faces numerous security challenges, including piracy, terrorism, and competing geopolitical interests. Ethiopia’s active contributions to regional peacekeeping efforts, particularly in Somalia through the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), bolster its argument that its pursuit of Red Sea access aligns with broader security imperatives. By presenting itself as a responsible regional actor, Ethiopia can counter any accusations from coastal states that its maritime ambitions are driven by expansionist motives.
Beyond security concerns, Ethiopia’s ongoing efforts toward economic integration within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) offer a compelling framework for Red Sea access as part of a broader strategy for regional economic cooperation. Ethiopia has been at the forefront of regional trade and infrastructure projects, recognizing that interdependence fosters long-term stability. As the “water tower of Africa,” Ethiopia possesses immense hydropower potential, with an estimated capacity of 60,000 MW. While only a portion of this potential has been harnessed, currently standing at 4,260 MW Ethiopia has already established power exchange agreements with key IGAD members. The country exports electricity to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, with plans for expansion. The ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project is a testament to Ethiopia’s commitment to regional energy cooperation. By leveraging its role as an energy supplier, Ethiopia can further strengthen economic ties with coastal states, turning its access to Red Sea ports into a mutually beneficial arrangement. A prime example of this economic interdependence is the Ethiopia-Djibouti partnership, wherein Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s port infrastructure, while Djibouti, in turn, benefits from Ethiopian electricity and trade. Extending this model to include transit corridors through Eritrea, Somaliland, or Somalia would require Ethiopia to negotiate similar economic incentives, ensuring that coastal states view Ethiopia’s Red Sea access as a strategic advantage rather than a perceived threat. By aligning its economic and diplomatic goals with the interests of its regional neighbors, Ethiopia can pave the way for broader cooperation and ensure that its pursuit of Red Sea access benefits all parties involved.
[1] ‘Overview’ (World Bank) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview> accessed 7 March 2025.
[2] Shimelash Wondale, “Effects of Ethiopia’s Landlocked Status on Ties with Its Neighbours” [2024] PL 19.
[3] ‘Ethiopia’s “Excessive” Port Fees Reach $1.6 Billion Annually, Prompting Calls for Sea Access – Birr Metrics’ (21 October 2023) <https://birrmetrics.com/ethiopias-excessive-port-fees-reach-1-6-billion-annually-prompting-calls-for-sea-access/> accessed 9 October 2024.
[4] United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.
[vi] ibid 127.
[5] ibid.
[6] ibid.
[7] ‘Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening)’ <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/94> accessed 7 March 2025.
[8] ‘Understanding-Ethiopia-and-Eritrea-Update-1.Pdf’ <https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Understanding-Ethiopia-and-Eritrea-update-1> accessed 2 March 2025.
[9] Dr Mohamed ELDoh, ‘The Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Alliance: A Strategic Counterbalance to Ethiopia’ (Geopolitical Monitor, 23 October 2024) <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-egypt-eritrea-somalia-alliance-a-strategic-counterbalance-to-ethiopia/> accessed 7 March 2025.
[10] ‘Blog: Hydropower Development in Ethiopia to Attain Sustainable Growth’ <https://www.hydropower.org/blog/blog-hydropower-development-in-ethiopia-to-attain-sustainable-growth> accessed 7 March 2025.
